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MOOT COURT
MARSH vs. ELECTRIC LIGHTING CO.
Negligence-lectriclighting company's duty to insulate wires-Chargeof
court-Harmlesserror.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant, an electric lighting company, allowed the insulation on its
wires to become worn where they entered plaintiff's house; a fire started at
that place during a thunder storm and destroyed the house. In a suit by the
plaintiff the trial court instructed that the defendant company was under a
duty to insulate its wires against lightning.
This is an appeal.
Hahn for the appellant.
The court erred in Its charge to the jury. Drake v. Kiely, 93 Pa. 498;
Bickham et al v. Smith, 5 Smith 335.
Tyler for the appellee.
Question of negligence for the jury. Elliottv. Allegheny Light Company,
207 Pa. 118; Sorrell v. Traction Company, 23 Sup. Ct. 425.
The charge, if erroneous, did not harm appellant and is no ground for all
appeal. Lautner v. Kann, 184 Pa. 334; Lewis apit. v. Springfield Water Company, 176 Pa. 237; Commonwealth v. Bubins, 197 Pa. 542.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

SIPES, J. :-The court was somewhat obfuscated when it examined the
briefs, since one brief represented the electric company as the appellant and
the other as the appellee.
We will treat the electric company as appellee and Marsh as the appellant,
and will confine ourselves strictly to the statement of facts.
We think the plaintiff was bound to give notice to the company of the defective insulation of its wires, and there is no evidence that any notice was
given. In Fitzgerald v. Electric ('o., 200 Pa. 540 it was held that plaintiff was
not bound to show direct notice of the defective insulation but may show that
it has existed for such a period that it ought to have been known to the au-
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thorities, but the plaintiff cannot even come within this liberal rule. In
Smith v. Light Co., 198 Pa. 19, it was held that an electric light company is
not liable for tile death of a person who is killed by touching a defectively
insulated wire while painting a roof, where there is no evidence that company
had notice of defective insulation.
If defendant was negligent in permitting its wires to remain in this dangerous condition then surely the plaintiffwas entitled to a recovery, but the
question of negligence was one for the jury. Devlin v. Beacon Co., 198 Pa.
583; Fitzgerald v. Electric Co., 207 Pa. 118.
The charge of the court below presented the case without prejudice to
either party. The plaintiff was not harmed by the charge, au( if erroneous
was a harmless error, which would not warrant a reversal; such is the law as
laid down in Lewis v. Water Co., 176 Pa. 237; Lautner v. Kann, 184 Pa. 334.
The Supreme Court will not reverse for statements not injurious to plaintiff's case. In Commonwealth v. Bubnis, 197 Pa. 542, it was held that the
Supreme Court would not reverse a conviction of first degree murder ue.ause
the trial judge did not accurately state the testimony, where it appears that
the portion of the charge complained of did no injustice to plaintilf" We think
it would be a work of supererogation to cite any more authorities.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The trial court informed the jury that the company was under a duty to
insulate its wires against lightning. If there was error in this, it was the
error of refusing to refer the question of duty to the jury and of deciding it by
the court; The latter practically said that an omission to insulate wasper se
negligence. It is evident, that of this error only tie defendant company could
take advantage on appeal.
We do not see, however, any error in the court's laying down a duty to insulate. The insulation, originally perfect, may be lost by wear or accident.
It would be a harsh rule that the company is under an absolute duty to prevent the loss, for any time, however brief, and from any cause, however uncontrollable, of this insulation. No facts are developed which would warrant
the court in saying that the company was negligent in allowing the specific
loss of insulation at the time of the accident. As the learned Superior Court
suggests, that loss might have been so recent that the company may, without
negligence, have been ignorant of it.
Judgment affirmed.

KIRBY vs. LINOLNT BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION.
Insurance-Interpretationof clause providingfor the naming of the beneficiary-Divorced wife allowed recovery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Kirby obtained a policy or certificiite from defendant for $2,000, to be
paid to his wife, Mary. The by-law of the association directed that each member should designate the person to whom the money should be paid, which
person must be a member of his family, or a blood relation, or one dependent
on him. It provided also, that if the beneficiary named should die before the
member, the benefit should be paid to widow, or children, or next of kin. It
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also allowed a change of beneficiary. Mary Kirlby obtained a divorce from
John, who, however, never changed the beneficiary. John married a second
time, and his second wife and her two children survived him. The association refusing to pay Mary, she brings this assunupsit.
H. C. Stewart for plaintiff.
Husband and wife haveeach insurable interest in life of other.
Centennial Mutual Ins. ("o., 21 Fed. Rep. 698. Where husband
benefit of wife, divorced wife may still have insurable interest in
band. 'McKee v. Phwnix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383 ; Appeal of Corson,
Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.

Watson v.
insured for
life of hus113 Pa. 438;

Reed for defendant.
Divorce dissolves duties, etc., accruing to married parties. Act of March
13, 1815. Divorced wonan not a widow. Ensign's Estate, 103 N. Y. 284 ;
Right of dower terminated by divorce. Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85 ; Miltimore v. Miltimore, 40 Pa. 151. Life insurance payable to fanilies of deceased
rmemlber, or their heirs, not payable to divorced wife.. Tyler v. Life Association,
145 Mass. 134. Divorced wife .lot in classes mentioned in by-laws.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BOWMAN, J.:-An insurable interest in the life of another, as defined by
the court in Keystone Mutual Benefit Association v. Morris, 115 Pa. 446, is
such an interest arising from the relation of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or
marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or beliefit from the continuance of his life."
At the time this insurance policy was obtained the plaintiff had an insurable interest, being the wife of the insured. Many cases could be cited in support of this statement, and this doctrine seems to be well settled in all jurisdictions.
First, it is well for the court to dispose of the cases cited by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff.
The first case cited by him is Watson v. Centennial .Mutual Insurance Co.,
21 Fed. Rep. 698. In this case it was held that husband and wife have each
an insurable interest in the life of the other by reason of the relation. With
this we have no quarrel. This decision seemu to be supported by the great
weight of authority.
The second case cited, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shaeffer,
4 Otto (94 U. S.) 457, recognized the right of a divorced wife to recover the insurance money. but it appears that in that case the insurance was on the
joint lives of the husband and wife, and the divorced wife paid the premiums
after the divorce. These were the grounds for the decision, and the court said,
"If a policy itself provides that the insurance must be to one having an insurable interest, then the divorced wife cannot recover."
The third case cited by plaintiff's counsel is McKee v. Phoenix Insurance
Co., 28 Mo. 383. In this case a divorced wife was allowed to recover, but the
decision was based on the fact that the divorced wife had children to the insured, the children being alive at,the time of the death of the insured.
The last cases cited by him are Appeal of Corson, 113 Pa. 438; Scott v.
Dickson, 108 Pa. 6. In these cases it was held that one may insure his own
life, pay tile premiuns thereon himself, for the benefit of another who had no
insurable interest in the insured. We think these cases are not sufficiently
similar to the one in question to be of much weight. In the former case the
beneficiary was a creditor of the insured ; in the latter the assignee of the beneficiary brought the action.
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The case of Overbeck v. Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5, held that an illegal wife of
the insured might recover the insurance money. But it was shown in that
case that the insured knew of the former wife, and that the beneficiary was an
illegal wife ; and the court, in deciding the case, considered the intention of
the insured.
The Massachusetts rule seems to be that life insurance payable to the families of deceased members, or their heirs, is not payable to a divorced wife.
Tyler v. Odd Fellows' Mutual Relief Association, 14.5 Mass. 134. This rule
seems to be followed in Pennsylvania, although we are unable to find a Pennsylvania case on "all fours" with our present one.
If, according to Spencer's Estate, 11 Dist. 419, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has a defeasible chose in action, then the plaintiff cannot recover. So held in McConnell v. Wenrich, 16 Pa. 365, where choses in action
obtained during marriage were not the property of the wife upon divorce.
Beneficiaries of life insurance policies are limited to the classes as set forth
in the by-laws or policies of the company, and persons outside of these classes
cannot recover. Vance on Insurance, p. 401. The by-laws of the Lincoln
Beneficial Association provided that the money should be paid to "a member
of the insured's family, or a blood relative, or one dependent on him." Mary
Kirby, the plaintiff, is not included in any of these classes. She is no longer
a member of the family of the insured, is not a blood relative, is not dependent
on him.
In line with this doctrine is Dolan v. Court of Good Samaritan, 128 Mass.
437, which held that the real contract of insurance is shown by the by-laws.
The court, in determining who is entitled to the insurance money, must
take into consideration the intention of the insured. Overbeck v. Overbeck,
155 Pa. 5; Masonic Aid Association v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99; Masonic Mutual Association v. Jones, 154 Pa. 107.
Mary Kirby had no insurable interest in the life of the insured. They
were divorced and estranged. A second wife had taken the place of Mary. It
is impossible to conceive that John Kirby intended his divorced wife to have
the benefit of his life insurance. True, he never changed the name of the
beneficiary, but we cannot presume from this that he wished Mary to receive
'
the money. He may have forgotten that the name "Mary" was in the policy,
or he may have thought that the by-laws would do what he neglected to do, i.
e., defeat Mary's fight to recover. It would be natural for him to have this
opinion, inasmuch as classes of beneficiaries were expressly provided for in the
by-laws.
We are not called upon to decide to whom this money should be paid, if
not to the divorced wife.
It seems so clear that a man could have no intention to have his life insurance paid to a divorced wife, particularly when he has a second wife and
children living ; and that Mary Kirby is not a member of any of the classes of
beneficiaries expressly mentioned by the by-laws, that our judgment is that
plaintiff cannot recover.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

John Kirby designated his wife, Mary, as the beneficiary. In so doing,
he complied with the by-law of the association, which directed that each member should designate as beneficiary a member of his family, or a blood relative,
or one dependent on him. Mary was a member of the family, and also dependent on him. The by-law provided for the case in which the beneficiary
should die before the member. That event not having happened, this provi-
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sion is irrelevant. The by-law also allowed the member to change the beneficiary. But the mode of changing him is prescribed by the by-law. Suffering
a divorce, at the suit of tile wife, is not a mode, nor is a subsequent marriage,
or the birth to it of children. John Kirby "never changed the beneficiary."
If he did not, who shall change it? Surely not the second wife, nor the
second set of children. The law does not vest them with such a power, nor.
have they attempted to exercise it. Surely not the association. It has no
power to change, on its own view of policy, or of the probable preference of the
member.
After the divorce, the second marriage occurred, and two children were
born. There was time in which John Kirby could have changed the beneficiary, in the prescribed mode, had he wanted to do so. What is the natural
inference from his not having done so, if not that he did not wish to do it ?
But even if we knew that he did wish, and even intend, to change the beieficiary, nevertheless, as he did nothing to manifest, appropriately, this wish
and intention, they would be wholly ineffectual. We are constrained, in
deference to these considerations, Brown v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 208 Pa. 101, to reverse the judgment.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

HARPER vs. SPINK.
Rule in Shelly's case -Charge on land devised to first taker-Assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hartzel devised his farm thus: "I give my farm to my son Harry and
his children ; he paying $2,000 to my executor." The farm was worth at his
death, not more than $2,000. Harry had three children who are still :dive.
He conveyed the farm to Harper and his heirs. Harper has contracted to
convey it in fee to Spink,, who declines to pay the purchase money and
accept a deed because Harper has only a life estate.
Duffy for the plaintiff.
Rule in Shelly's case applies. Devise to "children" of first taker vests fee
in him. Halderman v. Halderman, 40 Pa. 30; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335.
If word "children" mneans lineal heirs they are to be construed as "heirs of
body." Sifer v. Locke, 205 Pa. 616. Estates tail barred by Act April 27, 1885;
P. & L. Dig. 1882.-See also Act 8 April 1833.
S. D. Stuart for the defendant.
Son took life estate. Goursey v. Davis, 46 Pa. 25; Hague v. Hague, 161
Pa. 643. If first taker must pay acharge, he does not take a feeunder therule.
Crawford v. Oil Co., 208 Pa. 5.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

DAviEs, J.:-This is an action of assumpsit for breach of a contract to
convey real estate. The defendant, Spink, refuses to perform on the ground
that Harper has only a life estate. Harper purchased from one Hartzel, who
derived his title from his father by devise. The words of the devise are as
follows: "I give my farm to my son Harry and his children, he paying
$2,000 to my executor." The words to Harry and his children give Harry a
life estate with remainder in fee to his children. Hague v. Hague, 161 Pa.
643; Goursey v. Davis, 46 Pa. 35.
The object of all interpretation of wills is to ascertain the intention of the
testator. Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 884.
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The intention of the testator must be gathered from the will itself.
Miller's Appeal, 113 Pa 459; Baker's Appeal, 115 Pa. 591; Magee's Estate 11 C.
C. 559. In deciding upon the intention of the testator the court may consider
the value of the property devised. Marshall's Appeal, 2 Pa. 388; Barr's
Estate, lb. 428. Harry is to pay the executor $2,000, and the farm at the
death of the testator was worth not more than this sum. It would be grossly
unjust and inequitable, and manifestly not the intention of the testator, to
require Harry, the primary object of the testator's bounty, to pay $2,000 for a
life estate in a farm which in fee was not worth more than this sum; and to
allow his children to take the remainder in fee free from any charge whatever.
Beyond a doubt no sane man would expect another to pay for a life estate the
value of the estate in fee.
In construing a devise in many respects similar to the one under consideration, Justice Gibson said: "As the widow was personally liable to pay a sum
charged, though contingently, she might have been a loser by taking it for
life, and the implication, therefore, is that she should have a fee." Coane v.
Parnientier, 10 Pa. 72. Here, Harry, will certainly be a loser if he takes only
an estate for life.
The law enlarges an estat by implication -where the devise imposes a
charge upon the d evisee, in respect of the land devised. Jackson v. Bull, 10
Johnson 151; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 4 N. Y. 56; Spraker v. Van Alstyne, 18
Wen. 20; 13 N. J. E. 236.
"Heirs," "heirs of the body," "issue," "children," "sons," and similar
expressions are words of limitation or purchase according to the intent of the
testator in each particular will. Yarnell's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335.
We think that it is clearly the intention of the testator that children
should be taken as a word of limitation and not of purchase.
Therefore, by analogy to the rule in Shelly's case, Harry took an estate in
fee tail by implication. Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53; Piper v. Lbcke, 205 Pa.
616; Haldenan v. Haldeman, 40 Pa. 30; Pott's Appeal, 30 Pa. 168; Act of Assembly April 27, 1855, vol. 1, P. & L. 1882, is as follows: "Whereafter, hereafter, by any gift, conveyance or devise, an estate in fee tail would be created
according to the existing laws of this State, it shall be taken and construed to
be an estate in fee simple, and as such shall be freely alienable and inheritable." By force of this act Harry took an estate in fee simple and his conveyance passed to Harper an estate in fee simple in the farm.
Therefore, he was in a position to convey a fee to Spink and he is entitled to damages for the breach of the contract.
The measure of damages is the difference between the market price of the
farm and the contract price.
Verdict for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPEIEME COURT.

"I give my farm to my son, Harry, and his children, he paying $2,000 to
my executor," is the language of the devise. That, unqualified by facts, it
would give a life estate only to Harry and a remainder to his children, can
scarcely be doubted. Hague v. Hague, 161 Pa. 643; Coursey v. Davis, 46 Pa.
2.5; Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 208 Pa. 5.
The will, however, requires Harry to pay $2,000 to the executor and it is a
fact that the farm was not worth mori than that sum at the time of the testator's death. That a price must be paid for the land by the devisee, is not
decisive that he is to receive a fee simple. Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 94; Hinkle's
Appeal, 116Pa. 490; Crawford v. Furest Oil Co., 208 Pa. 5. The phrase "to my

THE

FORUM

97

son and his children" is not understood to impart a fee to the son, because he
must pay a sum of money for the land. Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 208 Pa. 5.
It is supposed that the equivalence of the sum to be paid by Harry Hartzel
to the actual value of the farm, is a cogent indication that he was intended
by the testator to receive a fee. We are not of this opinion. It does not
appear what is to be done with the $2,000. How much of it will Harry
receive? How many brothers and sisters has he? What other beneficiaries
of the testator are there? How long before the testator's death, the estimate
of $2,000 was put on the land by the testator we do not know. Perhaps when
the will was written, the land was worth S3,000 or $4,000. Besides, the testator may have desired his son to make an investment which would prevent
his wasting or hazarding his money, and which, while indirectly benefiting
himself, would make provision for helpless children. Expenditures of money
in behalf of children are not so rare that we must greatly marvel at one of
$2,000, which secures a life-estate to the father himself. We are not convinced
that the direction that Harry should expend $2,000 for the farm, is a reasonably sure indication that he was intended to take, or even that he himself
believed that he was intended to take a fee simple.
Judgment reserved.

COMMONWEALTH vs. SHERIDAN.
Evidened-Constitutionallaw-Admission of papers taken under illegal
search warrantagainstdefendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The facts are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.
Reno for the Commonwealth.
The Bill of Rights of Pennsylvania Constitution does not exclude the evidence. The evidence is admissible. 'aylor on Evidence, See. 922; Greenleaf
(16th ed) 254a; Reg. v. O'Donnell, 7 Car. & P. 138; Legatt v. Tollerney, 14
East 302; Coin. v. Ticketts, 5 Cush. 374; State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290;
Williams v. Georgia, 39 L. R. A. 269.
Barner for the defendant.
Cited provisions of U. S. and Pa. Constitution. The illegal seizure of
articles to be used in evidence against one is contrary to Fifth amendment.
Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616; Counselman v. Hitcock, 142 U. S. 547.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

J. :-At the trial of this criminal action, the Commonwealth
offered in evidence articles, tending to connect the defendant with the crime,
taken from his house underan illegal search warrant.. The defendant objected :
First, that to admit such evidence would violate the constijiutional provision that no person shall be compelled to furnish evidence, or be a witness,
against himself in a criminal case.
Second, that the search warrant was illegal, and that the admission of the
evidence would violate the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
It is true a man's papers are property which may be of utmost value and
significance, and that an arbitrary seizure of them, is among the deprivations
which the Ffth and Fourteenth amendments forbid. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U.
S 616.
But the question has another and important bearing, because the Fifth
HENNEKE,
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amendment provides that, no man shall be compelled in a criminal proceeding
to bear witness against himself, while the Fourth prohibits, "unreasonable
searches and seizures."
These clauses relate only to the United States; but the Fourteenth amendmient that, "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," seems broad enough to cover the same ground, because
the compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his papers to be used
as evidence to convict him of crime is an abuse of the process. 97 Pa. 147.
A conviction obtained by such means would obviously be erroneous, and a
sentence of fine and imprisonment founded upon it, a deprivation of which the
accused might justly complain.
In the case at bar the defendant did not own the property or have any
right in them. The Courts have said, there is a manifest difference between
the first proceeding and a search warrant for stolen goods. In the one the
owner is simply empowered to retake his property and place it, in the hands
of a public officer, until the felon's conviction entitles him to restitution. In
the other his property is taken from his possession to be used as a weapon of
offence, and matters that were intended for his own eyes are divulged, although
their nature may be such that they cannot be made public without danger to
his liberty, estate or reputation.
In the one case the government is entitled to possession of the property,
in the other it is not.
In fact seizure of stolen goods is authorized by common law.
In cases of seizures of stolen goods on search warrants, the goods have almost in all cases been given in evidence against the offender and no one supposed that a seizure for that purpose was a violation of the declaration of
rights. If the search warrant were illegal, the party on whose complaint the
warrant issued, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no
good reason for excluding the property seized as evidence if they are pertinent
to the issue, as they unquestionably are here. When property is offered ii
evidence, the court can take no notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral issue to determine that
question. See. 922 Taylor on Evidence; Coin. v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329.
This principle is regularly applied to incriminating material: tools, liquor,
documents, etc., obtained by uvlawful search ;f premises. State v. Griswold,
67 Conn. 290; Coin. v. Tibbets, 157 Mass. 519; Coin. v. Hurley, 158 Mass. 159;
Coin. v. Acton, 165 Mass. 11; Coin. v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370.
On the same principle a letter or other document obtained by fraud or other
dishonorable means is not excluded. Greenleaf on Evidence, See. 254a.
It is clear that members of Congress did not regard "searches and seizures"
of this kind as "unreasonable," and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendments.
We therefore admit them in evidence.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

That the defendant partieipated in the crime of larceny, of which he is accused, would be indicated by the presence of some of the stolen goods in his
house. It would not matter how this fact was brought to the knowledge of
the tribunal; nor whether by an act which was itself a violation of a constitutional or legal right of the accused, or otherwise. The question then is,
whether if evidence tending legitimately to establish the guilt of the defendant
has been unlawfully obtained, it must for that reason, be excluded.
If a man is kidnapped in one state to which he has fled, and forcibly
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brought into the state in which he has committed a crime, for trial, he is not,
for that reason, rendered imnune to trial and punishment. Ker v. Illinois,
119 U. S. 456; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183; Cooley Const. Law, 211.
The eliciting of a confession by threat or promise vitiates the confession,
because it tends to induce a false confession. Nevertheless, if the confessing
party discloses facts, and these facts, which would not otherwise have been
discovered, are discovered independently proveable. proof of them will be admitted. Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 209; Greenleaf Evidence, 369; 1
Wigmore Evidence, p. 990.
The fact that the evidence is discovered by means of a wrong, a trespass,
even a crime, is no adequate reason for refusing to hear it, when the purpose
of the proof is not to secure a benefit to the person who committed the wrong,
but to protect the state from crime. The diseussion of the question in Williams v. State, 39 L. R. A. 269, and in the cases there cited is satisfactory.
Judgment affirmed.
FERGUSON'S ESTATE.
Wills- Widow's election-Converion-Lapsedlegacis.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Samuel N. Ferguson died April 20, 1890, leaving to survive him a widow,
Minnie E. Ferguson, and one son, Daniel J. Ferguson, who died November 13,
1897, at the age of nine, and leaving to survive him his mother, Minnie E.
Ferguson. Samuel Ferguson also left to survive him a father, James 0 .Herguson, and the following brothers and sisters: John C. Fergusoma Margaret J.
Ferguson, Geo. B. Ferguson, and Win. M. Ferguson. The spid WCH. M.
Ferguson died Jan. 1, 1892, unmarried and without issue. By his lasf will
and testament he bequeaths his property to his father, James C. ]POPguson.
Samuel N. Ferguson died testate, the material portion of hh'. will being
sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. By said wrill
Mtinnie E. Ferguson was made residuary legatee. After the probating of said
will Minnie E. Ferguson filed a paper declining to take under suied wlTI D;nd
electing to take under the intestate law. On Sept. 3, 1900, the safi Minnie E.
Ferguson presented her petition asking for partition of said farm for thn purpose
of setting apart her dower. On the return day of the rule on heirs to elet to
take or refuse the real estate at the valuation, Geo. B. and James Ct. Ferguton,
as executors, elected to take the real estate at the valuation. Objections thereto
were filed, heard in lower court, and an appeal taken to the Suprelae Ccurt
(Ferguson's Estate, 204 Pa. 253) where they were refused the right to tako the
said valuation. The real estate was then sold and the fund is now before the
court for distribution.
Minnie E. Ferguson, the widow, contends that the balance of the money,
after paying the specific legacies to the legatees now living, should be distributed to her, while the heirs contend that the specific legacies should be distributed to them as well as the legacy which had been given to William M. Ferguson, now deceased, and all moneys over and above the dower.
Jacobsfor the wvidow.
Contended that one-third of the proceeds should be awarded to the widow
for life.
Reno for the heirs.
Widow electing to take against will takes under intestate law. Act April
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20, 1869, P. L. Dig. 1681. Where will works conversion of realty and widow
elects to take against the will, she cannot claim a portion of the proceeds of a
sale of realty as personalty under the intestate law. Hoover v. Landis, 76 Pa.
854. As to her there is no will znd sie is entitled only to one-thirdof the fund
for life. Win. Ferguson's legacy goes to residuum. Massey's Appeal, 88 Pa. 470.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARNHART, J. :-The material points in this case require no lengthy discussion. The question at issue is whether or not the distribution of the proceeds of the farm is to be determined by the provisions of the will, or under
the intestate law.
The testator died April 20, 1890. Within one year of this date it is to be
presumed that the widow made her election. Sie repudiated the will and
chose the provisions of the intestate law. Now, after seven yeqrs the son,
Daniel J., dies and the widow, repenting of her former choice and with' more
alacrity than fairness, faces about and desires to receive benefit under the ternis
of the will. The cases are clear that she cannot do this. Her election once
madeisfinal. She cannotclaim under the will, because she has elected to take
against it. As to her there is no will. Consequently she cannot accept the
will as to part and reject it as to another part. This is well settled law in
Pennsylvania and we have no hesitancy in saying that the intestate law governs here. Hoover v. Landis, 76 Pa. 364.
In conformance with the Act of April 20, 1869, in ease any person has died
or shall hereafter die, leaving a widow and last will and testament, and such
widow shall elect not to take under the will, in lieu of dower of the comnmon
law'la,theretofore, she shall be entitled to such interest in the real estate of her
deceased husband as the widows of decedents dying intestate are entitled to
under the qxqsting laws of the Commonwealth. The part pertinent hereto of
the eisting law referred to is as follows: Where such intestate shall leave a
widbw and Issue, the widow shall he entitled to the one-third part of the real
estate for the term of her life and to one-third part of the personalty absolutely.
Act ol Apr 1.8, 1833.
NoTw, can the widow claim her right in the proceeds of thesale of the farm
as.realty.or as personalty? Hoover v. Landis, supra., is authority for holding
that there was a conversion of the realty into personalty, according to the terms
of tRh will, providing for.the sale of the farm on the death of the son, Daniel J.
Moreover the conversion dates from the death of the testator, that is, April 20,
1890, before the widow makes her election. But the material point here is that
there was no conversion as to the widow. The conversion was brought about
by tWe will, but, as has been seen, as to the widow there was no will. So it
is seen th'it the widow will take her interest in the proceeds as realty, viz:
one-third interest for life, and not one-third of the price of the farm absolutely,
as personalty.
But the widow contends that the balance of the money for distribution,
after paying the specific legacies to the legatees now living, and also that the
$800 legacy to Win. M. Ferguson, deceased, should go to her. Inasmuch as
the widow did not elect to take under the will the residuum as to her lapsed,
and it is true that the legacy to the said Win. M. Ferguson also lapsed. The
deceased legatee died in 1892, before the happening of the contingency, viz:
the death of the son, Daniel J. Ferguson, in 1897. Massey's Appeal, 88.Pa.
470. However, we do not think that the widow is entitled to the residuum,
either in part or in whole, that is, not one-third absolutely as per the statute,
for the reason as given above, viz: that there was no conversion into person-
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alty, as to her; and not the entire residuum absolutely as per the will, because
she elected to take against the will, as to her there being no will.
Decree for the heirs.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The will gave to the widow a right to dwell in the dwelling house, and to
be supported by the farm, during the minority of the testator's son, Daniel.
Upon attaining his majority the will directs Daniel to "provide for the maintenance of his mother" during her widowhood. Should Daniel die a minor,
the executor is empowered to sell the land and to divide a portion of the proceeds
among certain legatees, and give the balance to the widow, unless she
remarried, in which case her share was to go to the same legatees in equal parts.
The widow refusing to take under the will, has, Daniel.having died a
minor, instituted partition for the purpose of having her dower set apart to
her, and the land has been sold. The will must be treated as a unit. As against
the widow, it is no will. She takes what would be hers had there been no will
at all. It is clear, then, that she is entitled, not to one-third of the proceeds,
but only to the interest annually accruing, on this third properly invested, or
allowed to remain in the land.
By renouncing the will, all the i'nterests created for her in it are given up
by the widow. She can no more claim the share of the proceeds, payable to
her on the sale of the land after her son's death in his minority, than the right
to occupy the dwelling house, and to obtain a maintenance from the farm
during his minority.
The gift of $800 to William AT. Ferguson was either vested or contingent,
and not transmissible from him. If vested, it passed to his father. If not
vested, the testator died intestate as to the $800 and it goes to the next of kin,
of whom the widow in not one.
It follows that the conclusion reached by thelearned court below is correct,
and the
Appeal must be dismissed.

TODD vs. SAVINGS BANK.
Savings bankcs-By-laws-easonableness-No recovery for deposit allowed
where required notice of loss of book was not given.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Todd, the plaintiff, entered into a contract with the Savings Bank, in
which it was stipulated that "the institution will not be responsible for loss
sustained when the depositor has not given notice of his book being stolen or
lost, if such book be paid in whole or in part on presentment." The Savings
Bank paid a person who had stolen the deposit book and represented himself
to be the depositor, but it made no special inquiries, and did not attempt to
compare the thief's signature with Todd's.
This is an action by Todd against the Savings Bank to recover the amount
deposited by him.
Carey for the plaintiff.
Bank liable to depositor for money paid on forged check to one having possession of bank book. Bank v. Cuops, 91 Pa. 315. Savings Bank book is not
negotiable. Smith v. Bank, 101 N: Y. 58.
ifenneke for the defendant.
By-laws are reasonable. Burrilv. Bank, 92Pa. 134; Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa.
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315. If savings bank pays money to one presenting a depositor's pass book,
and apparently in lawful possession thereof as owner, the true depositor cannot recover from the bank. Golden v. Bank, 123 Mass. 320 ; Leroy v. Bank,
117 Mass. 448.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Fox, J. :-At common law a savings bank is an institution, only partially
embodying the features of a bank in the full sense of the term, whose object is
to receive and solely invest the savings of mechanics, laborers, servants, minors
and others. It affords to such persons the advantages of security and interest
for their money. It has no capital stock. The deposits constitute its only resources. The depositors have no voice in the management of the same, nor in
the selection of persons who shall manage it. They are not stockholders. The
members of the corporation have no property interest in the funds entrusted
to them. The profits, after deducting the expenses of conducting the business,
inures wholly to the benefit of the depositors, either in dividends or in reserved
surplus for their greater security. 5 Cyc. 606; 24 Am. &Eng. Encyc. 1243. In
Pennsylvania savings banks may be created under the Act of Assembly, May
20, 1889, P. L. 246, P. & L. Dig. 4268. The articles of association shall specify
the object for which it was formed, and may contain provisions which the
association may desire to adopt for the regulation and conduct of its business.
The Act of Assembly, May 14, 1891, P. L. 61, P. & L. Dig. 946, also gives to
corporations the right to enact by-laws which may be pertinent and necessary
for the business to be transacted. Under the authority given in the above
acts, or under its common law authority to enact by-laws, the Savings Bank
did enact the following by-law, which became a part of the contract of said
bank with Todd: "The institution will not be responsible for loss sustained
when the depositor has not given notice of his book being stolen or lost, if such
book be paid in whole or in part on presentment."
A savings bank, therefore, may enact by-laws which are necessary for the
business to be transacted, provided always, the by-law be a reasonable one.
This was held by implication in (upps v. People's Savings Bank, 91 Pa. 315.
In that case the plaintiffs were allowed to recover, not because the by-law was
not a reasonable one, but because the savings bank did not pay out the money
in conformity to its by-laws. A similar by-law to the one in this case was expressly decided in Burrell v. Dollar Savings Bank, 92 Pa. 134, to be reasonable
and necessary for the safety of such corporations. In this case the plaintiff
was unable to read the rules printed in the bank book delivered to him. This
fact, it was so held, made no difference, as he should have become acquainted
with the terms of the contract.
The bank, however, made no "special" inquiry, nor did it attempt to
"compare" the thief's signature with that of Todd's. The by-law in this case
was a part of the contract. Todd, therefore, had notice of its existence, and
also of the term in the contract which required him to give notice to the bank,
as soon as the book was lost, of that fact. Todd did not report the loss of the
book. In the absence of negligence or bad faith, then, on the part of the bank,
Todd cannot recover without violating the terms of his contract. The book
having been lost, and no notice having been given, was the fact that the bank
did not make such "inquiry and comparison" such negligence on their part as
to make them liable to Todd, notwithstanding the above by-law, or can the
bank make such by-law and relieve itself from allliability, no matter to whom
or how the depositors' money is paid out?
The bank was under no duty to make a "special"
inquiry, and the fact
that it made no comparison of the signatures would present a question of neg-

THE FORUM
ligence for the jury. Assuming that the thief may have simulated the handwriting of Todd, which he probably did, and the bank having received no notice from Todd of the loss of his book, and knowing that the book was not negotiable, they had a right to assume that it was being presented by the owner,
and were, therefore, using all the diligence required. Kennel v. Germania
Savings Bank, 127 N. Y. 488 ; Goldrick v. Savings Bank, 123 Mass. 320; Levy
v. Savings Bank, 117 Mass. 448.
We think the plaintiff, Todd, is not entitled to recover.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It is not to be denied that a savings bank may make regulations binding
on its depositors. To require these to give notice of a loss or theft of their
books is entirely reasonable. The depositors being very numerous, the bank
officers could not be expected to remember their faces, or otherwise to be able
to identify them. Had notice been given by Todd, the bank would have been
on the watch for his book, and would have declined to pay it. When the book
was presented, it had no reason to suspect that the theft had occurred, or that
the one who presented the book was doing so without leave of the owner.
It appears that the bank made no "special inquiries," nor attempted to
"compare the thief's signature with Todd's." It does not appear what these
inquiries might have been, nor, if made, that they would probably have led to
the discovery that the book had been stolen. It is not shown that a comparison of the thief's signature with Todd's would likely have revealed to the bank
that the former was not Todd. Should we concede that the bank was negligent in omitting to make these inquiries and adopt these precautions against
imposition, yet, if this omission did not cause the success of the imposition, it
in no way excuses the failure of the plaintiff to give the requisite notice.
Judgment affirmed.
FOLEY vs. MAPES.
in stock by way of margin.Evidence-Ofhabit,when receivable-Transactions
Gambling contracts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mapes bought stocks of Foley, a broker, from time to time, twenty times,
and in payment of a balance gave his note for $5600 upon which this suit was
brought. The defense is that the transactions were gambling. Mapes offered
evidence that Foley kept a "bucket-shop"; that many, most of his customers
settled their transactions not by securing certificates of stock and paying their
value but by obtaiuing credit when the stocks were higher in value than the
price bid and being debited when they were lower in value. He offered to
prove that he had no intention when dealing to pay the value of the shares
but intended only to pay differences. He also swore that it was understood
between them that only differences were to be paid. Foley swore there was
no such agreement. The offers as to "bucket shop" and as to defendant's intention and as to the practice of Foley's customers were rejected.
Lewis for plaintiff.
A purchase of stock for speculation, even when done merely on a margin, is
not necessarily agambling transaction. Peters v. Grinn, 149 Pa. 163. The true
test whether such transactions are mere wagers or not, is, whether there was
in good faith a purchase and an intention to deliver, or receive the stock, and
it is for the jury to ascertain these facts. Fereira v. Gahell, 89 Pa. 89; Garr v.
Bew, 153 Pa. 243.
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.furdock for defendant.
No recovery can be had oil a note, the consideration arising from a stock
transaction on a margin. Fareira v. Gahell, 89 Pa. 89; Swartz's Appeal, 3
Brewster 131. Such contracts are void as well between joint principals as between principal and broker. Thompson's Estate, 15 Phila. 532.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
REXACH, J..:-This is an action in assurnpsit brought by Foley ol a note

for $500 given as claimed in payment of a balance due to him by Mapes, who
resisted payment on t.-e groun.d that the consideration for which the note was
given is illegal, because it originated by buying and selling stock on margin.
Mapes offered in evidence in proof of his assertion that Foley kept a "bucketshop;" that many, most of his customers, settled their transactions, not by
receiving certificates of stock and paying their value, but by obtaining credit
when the stocks were higher in value than the price bid and being debited
when tl~ey were lower in value, and that he had no intention when dealing to
pay the value of the shares, but intended to pay only differences. The trial
court rejected this evidence.
It is a well settled principle in the law of Pennsylvania that no recovery
can be had on a note, the consideration of which has arisen from a stock
transaction on a margin, which transaction is considered as a gambling one
and therefore void. Fereira v. Gahell, 89 Pa. 89.
But not all the purchases and sales of stock through a broker are gaxnbling
transactions. A purchase of stock for speculation even done merely on margin
is not necessarily a gambling transaction. If one buys stock from A and
borrows the money from B to pay for it there is no element of gambling in the
operation, though he pledge the stock with B as security for the money. So,
if instead of borrowing the money from B, a third person, he borrows it from
A, the transaction is not necessarily different in character. But in this.latter
case, there being no transfer or delivery of the stock, the doubt arises whether
the parties intended there should ever be a purchase or delivery at all. If
there was not under any circumstance to be a delivery as part of and completing a purchase then the transaction was a mere wager on the rise and fall of
prices; but if there was in good faith a purchase, then the delivery might be
postp6ned or made to depend on a future condition and the stock carried on
margin or otherwise in the meanwhile without affecting the legality of the
operation. Peters v. Grinn, 149 Pa. 163.
Hence the true test whether such transactions are mere wagers or not, is
the facts whether there was in good faith a purchase and an intention to deliver or receive the stock, and it is for the jury to ascertain these facts. Fereira
v. Gahell, 89 Pa. 89; Garr v. Bew, 153 Pa. 243. In the present case the defendant swore that it was understood between him and the plaintiff, that only
differences were to be paid; but the plaintiff denied that there was such
understanding. The jury, on the only evidence allowed, has found for the
plaintiff and therefore we must be bound by its finding and take for granted
that there was a real purchase and an intention on the part of the plaintiff to
deliver the stock.
The second question that now confronts us, is whether the evidence offered
by the defendant was rightly rejected or not. It is clear that the defendant's
intention to deal only on margin cannot affect the validity of the transaction,
since the plaintiff at any time could tender him the stock and demand the
price; the defendant, then could not plead his own intention.to resist the performauce of the contract. "1Nemo allegansturpitudinemsuam audicudus est."
As we have said before, the test for the validity of these stock transactions
is whether there was going to be a delivery or not; therefore each separate and

THE FORUM

105

individual case must stand upon and be decided by the evidence applicable
to it. It does not affect the case that the plaintiff kept a "bucket shop" and
has dealt with other persons on margin without intention of delivery, provided
that in this particular transaction there was the purpose in good faith of delivery of the stock. The fact of a person having once or many times in his
life done a particular act in a particular way, does not prove that he has done
the same thing in the same way upon another and different occasions.
In Thompson v. Borrie, 4 Wallace (U. S.) 463, whose facts are in line to
those of the case at bar, viz : Thompson brought suit to recover on 3 promissory notes given by Borrie to one Steer, and indorsedto him. Borrie's defense
was that they were found in a gaming consideration. As no direct evidence was offered to impedch the consideration of the notes, a brother of the
defendant was allowed to testify that whenever his brother was under the influence of liquor, lie had a propensity to gamble. It was contended, that as
defendant was drunk on the morning the notes were given and as they were
in the handwriting of a professional gambler and payable to the keeper of a
gaming house, the inference was that they were given for money won at play;
it was held by the highest court of the land that the court below erred in admitting such evidence.
In Norris v. Smith, 7 Cowen (N.Y.) 718, it was held that the uniform
habit of a party to loan money at usurious interest is not a legal foundation
for a verdict establishing usury, although one usurious loan had been proved
between the parties to the suit.
We believe this to be also the law in Pennsylvania, that in order to prove
the existence or non-existence of a certain fact or that a certain fact was done
by a particular person or in a particular manner, evidence of the existence or
non-existence of a similar but distinct and disconnected fact, or that a similar
act was done by such person or in such manner, is inadmissible. P. & L. Dig.
of Dec., Col. 9495.
Therefore the evidence of the intention of the defendant and that the
plaintiff kept a "bucket shop" was rightly rejected by the trial court.
The counsel for the defendant raises another point in his brief, in favor of
his client, pointing out that a broker is merely the agent of his principal, and
that an agent having authority only to collect a debt has no right to take a
note for the amount of it from the debtor to himself and thus substitute himself for the creditor. We have not been able to find the authority cited by the
defendant's counsel, on account of misquotation in his brief of the number of
the report, but we believe that this principle applies only to the principal who
can ratify or reject the unauthorized act of his agent, and sue on the note or
demand the money from the third party. It is true also that in Pennsylvania
the third party dealing with an unauthorized agent, can withdraw from his
contract at any time before it is ratified by the principal; but we think that
this principle applies only when no consideration has moved from the agent
to him, or where lie offers to return the consideration receiyed. Let ussuppose
that A authorizes B to sell his horse for $100 cash. B sells it to C, and in consideration thereof B receives C's note payable to himself, at 3 months from
date. If B tenders to A the note of (, A can ratify the act of B and receive
the note in payment, or he can reject the act of B and demand the money from
C. But if B, instead of tendering the note to A, appropriates it to himself and
pays the $100 to A from his own pocket, can C, when the note becomes due,
resist payment on the ground that it was an unauthorized actand besides keep
the horse? We believe he cannot, and this is what the defendant's counsel
asks us to do. Since the jury has found that the transaction was fair, it is pre-
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surned that Foley has paid to his undisclosed principal the sum of $500, giving
Mapes the credit for them.
Besides that the defendant had said that he dealt with Foley with the purpose of dealing on margin, therefore treating him before the law as principal
(Ruckisky v. DeHaven, 97 Pa. 202), and will be unfair now to allow him to
turn around and say that he was dealing with him only as an agent.
On these considerations and authorities cited, we let the verdict and judgment stand.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The right of Foley to recover depended on the absence of a gambling element in the transactions between him and Mapes. If the understanding between them was that the stocks were not to be paid for, but only the differences between the price agreed on and their market value, Foley could not
recover. What was the evidence upon this question?
Foley denied the existence of any such agreement, Mapes affirmed it.
There was witness against witness. This being so, corroboration of Mapes or
of Foley was important. Should the court have received the evidence rejected?
It was that Foley kept a bucket shop, that most of his customers settled their
transactions by paying or receiving differences. It is easier to believe that the
dealings with Mapes were as he alleged them to be, when it appears that his
dealings with most of his customers v ere of the same sort, than it would.otherwise be, and for the purpose of corroboration, we think the evidence should
have been receied.
We are aware that in some cases, proof of the habit of doing a certain kind
of act has been excluded, as evidence of the doing of that act on the occasion
in question. Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528; Morris v. Guilty, 188 Pa. 534;
Cf. McDonald v. Gersler, 209 Pa: 177. On the other hand, the habit was received, to justify the inference that an act of the same sort was done, or would
have been done, had the same circumstances existed. Meighen v. Bank, 25
Pa. 288, explaining Schoneman v. Fegley, 14 Pa. 376; Cf. Wheeler v. Ailers,
189 Pa. 138; Penna. R. R. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339; Huntingdon R. R. Co. v.
Decker, 82 Pa. 119; Penna Co. v. Phila. Ger. & Norristown R. R., 153 Pa. 160.
An informing discussion of the subject may be found in 1 Wigmore Evid. p.
166, et seq.
In reaching a result different from that reached by the learned court
below, we do not disparage the lucidity, precision and force of its able opinion.
In these respects it is exceptional.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.

HENDERSON vs. SMITH.
fortgage for purchase money-Power of married women-Act 8 June, 1893
does not invalidatepurchasemoney mortgage given by marriedwoman
withoutjoinderof husband.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mirs. Smith bought a house and lot from Jas. Henderson, paying $500 in
cash, and secured withoutjoining her husband the balance, $1500, by a purchase
money mortgage. Henderson, two years afterward, instituted proceedings to forclose, when Mrs. Smith's husband defended on the ground that the mortgage
was void.
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Jacobs for the plaintiff'.
Before Act of 1893 a married woman had power to give purchase money
mortgage withoutjoininz her husband. Act of June 8, 1893, an enlarging act.
Therefore married woman's powers inelreased and not lessened. But to say
that power to give mortgage restrained bv that act is notgiving the legislation
the desired effect. Reed's Estate. 3 D. R. 503 ; Simms' Estate, 20 Sup. 450;
194 Pa. 210; Glass v. Warnick, 40 Pa. 140. 1. Trickett, on Liens, 150; Campe
v. Home, 158 Pa. 508.
Shwartzkopf for defendant.
Married woman cannot execute a mortgage without her husband joining.
Act June 8, 1893. Reed's Estate, 3 D. R. 503; Bingler v. Bowman, 194Pa. 210.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

J. :-Mrs. Smith's husband claims the mortgage is void, because it
was made without his joining, which he says is required by the Act of June 8,
1893. The first seetion of the act enacts that: "Thereafter a married woman
shall have the same right and power as an unmarried person to acquire, own,
possess, control, use, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of any property of any
kind, real, personal, or mixed, and either in possession or expectancy, and
may exercise the said right and power in the same manner and to the same
extent as an unmarried person, butshe may not mortgage or convey her real
property unless her husband join in such mortgaige or conveyance."
It seems that even prior to the act of June 8, 1893, the law in Pennsylvania was, that a married woman could not mortgage her real property without her husband joining. This is the general rule, but it is not applicable to a
purchase money mortgage. "A mortgage for the purchase money of laud conveyed to a wife, is An exception ; it will be enforced, though the husband does
not join in it." Trickett on the Law of Liens in Pennsylvania, 122, citing
Glass v. Warwick, 40 Pa. St. 140. This case is similar to the one at bar, a
married woman buying land, receiving a deed and giving for the balance of
the purchase money a bond and mortgage in her own name, without her husband joining. Graham, P. J., in his charge to the jury, said: "That a married woman cannot, without her husband joining her, encumber her property
by mortgage, or sell or dispose of it, is, as a general proposition, correct, but
does not apply to cases of this kind, where a married woman purchases real
estate, and takes a bond in her own name, and gives a mortgage to secure the
purchase money, she cannot hold the land and refuse to pay for it ; and payment may be enforced by a proceeding on the mortgage and sale of the land ;
although a married woman would not be personally responsible on her bond
or warrant in the mortgage and the court would restain plaintiffto proceeding
against the land purchased." Lowrie, C. J., in his opinion', affirming the
lower court, said: "In strict law a married woman has no power to make any
such contracts, except when joined with her husband, and it is qnly by way
of equity that they are enforced, and so as to prevent great injustice, and they
are enforced rather according to the necessities of common justice, than according to the terms of the contract."
The next question is, did the legislature by the use of the word mortgage
in the Act of June 8, 1893, mean to include purchase money mortgages?
In Whitinger v. Jack, 16 Pa. C. 0. 112, Rayburn, P. J., said: "The Act of
1893 certainly does to a great extent enlarge the powers of married women
over their separate property. But from the time these restraints placed by the
law upon married women, as to the disposition of their property began to be
removed by legislation, the courts until now have'been giving the Acts of
Assembly relative to such restraints a conservative construction, and we do
not feel at liberty to depart from this, and read into the act now under our
JONES,
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consideration that which would repeal the former law as to acknowledgments
of deeds by married women."
We think it would not be giving A conservative construction of the Act of
June 8, 1893, for us to hold that the intention of the legislature was, that the
act should apply to a purchase money mortgage.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

When the law denied to a married woman power to contract and to give
a valid warrant of attorney to confess judgment for money, she could, nevertheless, give such warrant of attorney for purchase of money of land conveyed
to her.
She could also execute a mortgage upon premises bought by her, in which
her husband did not join, for the purchase money and the mortgage would
be enforceable. Glass v. Warwick, 40 Pa. 140; 0' Shnyder v. Noble, 94 Pa.
286; Fryer v. Rishell. 84 Pa. 521; Bigham's Appeal, 123 Pa. 262. The conveyance to her being subject to the intended lien for the purchase money, it would
be inequitable to allow the estate to remain in her, while striking down the
lien.
The legislation of 1848, 1887 and 1893, concerning the powers of married
women, did not design to lessen, but to broaden, these powers. We are not,
therefore, to understand that under it a inarried woman, purchasing land, can
resist the enforcement of a mortgage given by her for its purchase money, on
the ground that her husband did not unite in its execution.
The opinion of the learned court below amply justifies the decision reached.
Judgment affirmed.

RICE vs. WILLIAMS.
Contract-Afistake as to the subject matte-_atificationof mistake-? epio in.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

One John Rice was the owner of a bay horse. His brother owned a -hite
horse, and Rice frequently borrowed and was seen driving it. One Peter Ashley met Rice on the train, and said, "I'll give you $150 for your horse." Rice
replied, "I accept your offer." Ashley had in mind the white horse, while
Rice, of course, meant the bay one. Later Ashley told Pierce of the bargain,
and Pierce told him of the mistake, but assured him that the bay horse was a
bargain at $150. Ashley accordingly decided that he did not mind the mistake, and, without mentioning it to Rice, he paid the money and got the horse.
Ashley then sold the horse for $175 to one Williams, who knew nothing of the
Rice transaction. Rice now hears of the fact that Ashley had meant the white
horse at the time of the sale, and decides to take advantage of the fact to avoid
the sale. He has tendered Williams $150, and demanded the horse. Williams
refuses to deliver. Rice sues in replevin.
-McAlee for the plaintiff.
An agreement must, in order to constitute a contract, enforceable at law,
be certain and explicit in its terms, and not vague or general. P. & L. Digest
of Decisions, 4008.
An acceptance, to be good, must in every respect ineet and correspond with
the offer, neither falling within nor going beyond the terms proposed, but
exactly meeting them at all points, aind'closing with them just as they started.
Park for the defendant.
Mistake, to have the effect of invalidating a contract, must go to the root
of the contract, and must be such as to negative the idea that the parties were
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ever ad idem; for, if the buyer purchases the very article, at the very price,
and on the very terms intended by him and the seller, the sale is completed
by mutual assent. Tiffany on Sales, p. 30.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

SHOWALTER, J. :-In order to decide this question, it is necessary to determine whether Ashley took a good title from Rice in the transaction. If a
good title passed, there can be no doubt but that Ashley could give Williams
a good title, and then Rice would have no ground upon which to base his action of replevin against Williams.
The verbal agreement made between the seller and the purchaser while on
the train was void, because there was a mistake as to the identity of the subject matter, and at this stage of the transaction neither party was bound by
his agreement. When Ashley heard he was mistaken as to which horse Rice
intended to sell, he did not notify Rice of the mistake, and refuse to perform
his part of the apparent contract of sale, but elected to accept the horse that
the vendor had really intended to sell. Here, for the first time, there was a
meeting of minds, for ever since the meeting on the train the seller had intended to sell this very home, at least there is no intimation that he thought
otherwise until after the delivery of the horse.
While it is tru&there can be no contract without the consent of all the
parties to it, it is not necessary that their wills should concur at the same instant if the will of the party accepting the proposition is declared before the
will of the one making it is revoked. Morris v. Pierson, 6 Ia. 279.
A contract of sale may be implied from the conduct of the parties. Another
way of looking at this transaction would be to consider the delivery of the
horse by the seller as an offer, and the taking of it by the buyer as an acceptance. Here, certainly, the minds of the vendor and the vendee met. There
was an offer and an acceptance, there was a consideration and a delivery, in
fact, there were all the requirements to constitute a valid sale.
After the delivery of the horse, revocation of the contract was too late.
Because the state of mind of the seller in the first part of the transaction was
not the same as the buyer's, is no good reason in law or equity why he should
now be allowed a return of the property, especially since such return would not
place all the parties in statu quo.
In view of these facts, we render our judgment in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

This is an action of replevin by a vendor to recover from the vendee's purchaser for value, and without notice, the property originally sold. The tender
made was twenty-five dollars less than the purchaser paid. Manifestly, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to show by indubitable reasoning that legally he
is entitled to inflict this loss upon an innocent person. No law, however, has
been brought to our attention sustaining the claims of the plaintiff, and, accordingly, we concur in the conclusion of the learned court below, although
not approving its reasoning. The facts disclose a valid contract of bargain and
sale. There was a plain, unqualified offer by Ashley to buy Rice's horse at a
specified price, responded to with a simple, unconditional acceptance, the effect
of which was to immediately vest title and the risk of property in and upon
the vendee. "When a price is agreed upon, and the goods ascertained, the
right of property will pass at once, without payment on one side or actual delivery on the other. It-is specification, not delivery, that is essential to the
vesting of title." Schnebly v. Shirtcliff, 7 Phila. 236, per Hare, J. Undoubtedly, a contract of sale may be rendered innocuous by mistake, but that mistake must be mutual. We fail to discover any evidence of such mutuality in
our facts. At best, there is but an exparte blunder. Ashley made an offer
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for Rice's horse, which offer was duly accepted.

It would be preposterous for

the law to permit Ashley to avoid his contract because he thought the vendor's
horse was a white one, whereas it turned out to be a bay horse. He should
have made sure his knowledge before advancing the offer, or he might have
safeguarded himself by confining his offer for the white horse. The court below seems to have been led into the maze by that hoary but deceptive shibboleth, "meeting of minds." We do not understand the law as seekingto fathom
the cerebrations of contracting parties, but as contenting itself with the externalities resulting from such mental processes. Holmes, Common Law. Al
offeree has a legal right to rely on what' an offeror says, unqualified by what
he thinks. However, Ashley does not seek to avoid the contract, but Rice
endeavors to obtain relief from his own contract, knowingly made, by subrogating himself, so to speak, to Ashley's supposed rights. Success in such a
course would be monstrous. Moreover, granting the original sale whs voidable, any equity of the vendors would be cut off, the legal title subsisting in a
bonafide purchase for value. Upon these observations, judgment of the lower
court is affirmed.

WALKER SHOE CO. vs. BOSTON STORE.
Sale.-Executory contract-Goods deliverable in installments-Damagesfor
breach by vendee-Rule as to recovery of profits.
STATEM ENT OF THE CASE.

A traveling salesman, representing the Walker Shoe Co., secured from the
Boston Store an order for500 pairs of shoes. The shoes were to be delivered at
the rate of 50 pairs per month, and paid for as delivered. The shoe company
promptly acknowledged the receipt of the order, and promised to fill it according to its terms.
After the receipt of the first hundred pairs of shoes the Boston Store wrote
countermanding the order, and have since refused all shoes tendered, without
giving any reason for their conduct.
The shoe company states that it paid the salesman, who secured the order,
a commission of twenty-five cents per pair when the order was received, and
that they anticipated a profit of $300 on the sale.
The trial court charged the jury that the plaintiff could recover the sum
of the commission paid the salesman and the anticipated profit.
Defendant appeals.
Barner for the appellant.
When the vendee breaks a contract the vendor may recover the profit he
would have made by the completion of the bargain. Collins v. Delaporti, 115
Mass. 162; Haskell v. Hunter, 23 Mich. 305; McCracken v. Webb, 36 Ia. 551;
Dustan v. McAndrews, 44 N. Y. 72; Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426.
Rauffenbart for-the appellee.
To recover damages for a loss of profit resulting from a breach of contract,
plaintiffsm must prove not only that they have been prevented from performing
it by default of defendant, but also that they .have sustained loss t hereby.
Lentz et at. v. Chotram, 42 Pa. 435; Smith v. Long. 132 Pa. 301.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

LAUB,
%. :-A brief statement of the facts in this case is as follows: The
defendant company, through a salesman of the plaintiff company, ordered 500
pairs of shoes, to be delivered at the rate of 50 pairs per month, and to be paid
for as delivered. The plaintiff company accepted the order, and promised to
fill it according to its terms. After receiving the first hundred pairs of shoes,
the defendant company countermanded the order and refused all shoes subse-
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quently tendered, without giving any reason for so doing. The plaintiff comnpany states that it paid the salesman, who secured the order, a commission of
twenty-five cents per pair when the order was received, and that they anticipated a profit of $300 on the sale. The court below charged the jury that the
plaintiff company could recover the sum of the commission paid the salesman
and the anticipated profit. The defendant company then appealed to this
court.
The question for our determination is, whether there was error in that part
of the charge just mentioned.
The verdict of the jury establishes the fact that the defendant company
had no sufficient grounds for such a refusal, and it may also be taken as settled
by the verdict of the jury that the breach of the contract occurred when the
defendant company refused to accept the shoes subsequently tendered, and to
fulfill the terms of the contract. Hooper, Seving & Co. v. Bromley Bros. Carpet Co., 11 Pa. Super. 636. As to the 100 pairs delivered and accepted there is
no dispute, the contention being only as to the remaining 400 pairs.
The right of the vendor to sue in a contract of sale of articles to be delivered
in installments throughout a period of time arises immediately on the repudiation of the contract before the time for full performance by the vendee. Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 61. Even if the shoes were not
yet manufactured, the plaintiff is not bound to continue the making after the
rescission and take his chances of securing a purchaser for goods which he
manufactured according to order only. Delaplaine v. Phila. Am. Co., 2 Pa.
Super. 545. It has been well said that the promise to deliver involved in an
agreement of sale and the promise to pay the purchase money are mutually
dependent, and neither party is bound to perform without a contemporaneous
performance by the other. While both actsareconcurrent, onewill frequently
precede the other, and the case is one requiring mutual good faith and confidence.
Tile general rule is, that if it is a part of the contract of sale that the seller
shall deliver the property slld at some place specified, and receive payment on
delivery, title will not pass until such delivery. In Torry v. Wheeler, 2.5 N.
Y. 525, it was said, " If the payment was to be made on or after the delivery
at a particular place, it might fairly be inferred that the contract was executory
until such delivery." The same doctrine was substantially held in Mackaness
v. Long, 85 Pa. 158. When the agreement of sale is for a thing not specified,
as of an article to be manufactured or of a certain quantity of goods in general,
without specific identification of them, or an "appropriations" of them to the
contract, as it is technically termed, the contract is executory and the property
does not pass. Haldeman v. Hunter, 51 Pa. 66. There is a binding contract
as to the amount actually delivered and accepted, or as to the amount ordered,
if such order is accepted. Eckert v. Shoch, 155 Pa. 530. Hence, under the
authorities above cited, we hold that the sale was executory as to the 400 pairs
refused by the vendee. Now, the vendor of personal property in a suit against
the vendee for not taking and paying for the property has the choice ordinarily of either one of three methods to indemnify himself: (1) He may store
or retain the property for the vendee, and sue him for the entire purchase
price. (2) He may sell the property, acting as the agent for this purpose of
the vendee, and recover the difference between the contract price and the price
obtained on such resale. Or (3) he may keep the property as his own and recover the difference between the market price at the time and place of delivery and the contract price. Sedgwick on Damages, 28a; Hayden v. Deneets, 53 N. Y. 426.
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According to the facts, the plaintiff in this case chose the last of these
methods. Hence, this brings the case within the rule, that the measure of
damages for a refusal to receive the goods in an executory contract of sale is
the difference between the price agreed upon and the market value on the day
appointed for delivery. Unexcelled Fire Works Co. v. Polites, 130 Pa. 536;
Keeler Co. v. Schott, 1 Pa. Super. 458. In the last case mentioned it was also
held, that the same rule is applied where the agreement is for the sale of goods
to be manufactured.
The loss of profits or advantages which must have resulted from a fulfillinept of the contract may be compensated in damages, where they are the
direct and immediate fruits of the contract, and must, therefore, have been
stipulated for and have been in the contemplation of the parties when it was
made. Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, 36 Pa. 360; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Pa. 365 ; Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N. Y. 205;
Bagley v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489; Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill (N.
Y.) 61. The last mentioned case was referred to with approbation by Strong,
J., in Hoy v. Grenoble, 34 Pa. 9, he further saying: "While it is well settled
that a jury are not at liberty to allow mere speculative damages, yet there are
cases in which a plaintiff has been held entitled to what he would have made
had the contract been fulfilled ; I mean, to what he would have made immediately out of the contract. The loss of such profits is not consequential in the
sense in which consequential damages are sometimes said to be too remote.
They are in immediate contemplation of the parties when the contract is made.
Thus, in contracts for the sale and delivery of goods at a designated time or
place, the damages are measured by the price of the goods on the day named,
or at,the place specified. This is in effect making him responsible for profits."
We cannot say, therefore, that the jury were misled in this case by being
told the plaintiff could recover the anticipated profit. This was but another
mode of saying that he was entitled to the value of his bargain, or what he
would have made directly out of the contract if it had been fulfilled. In Garsed v. Turner, 71 Pa. 59, Williams, J., said: "What was the value of the bargain, if it was not the profit which the plaintiff would have made immediately
out of the contract if he had been allowed to perform it? If the damages found
by the jury would have put the plaintiff in the same position pecuniarily as
he would have been if the contract had been lept, then it is clear that he recovered the value of his bargain, viz: the direct profit which he would have
made out of the contract if it had not been broken."
As to that portion of the charge of the court below which said the plaintiff
could recover the sum of the commission paid the salesman, we think there
was error.
The general custom among salesmen working for orders on commission is,
that if the compensation is expressly made contingent on a particular event,
he will have no claim unless it actually occurs. And this is the only interpretation that can be put on an agreement to effect sales for a percentage on the
price. A traveling salesman who takes orders from purchasers for his employer's goods is not, in a technical or popular sense, a broker or factor, although he may be compensated for his services by commissions on the sales so
effected by him. Hamberger v. Marcus, 157 Pa. 133. The action iu Creveling
v. Wood & Lemnan, 95 Pa. 157, was by the salesmen against their employers to
recover commissions. The trial judge in that, case instructed the jury that if
the plaintiffs (the agents) brought the defendant and purchaser together, and
"there was an act of sale or purchase passing from one to the other, the one
agreeing to do and the other accepting, this constitutes a sale so far as the
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agent employed is concerned, who, when be has gained the mutual assent of
the minds of the peison who desires to purchaseand of him who desires tosell,
has then performed what he agrees to perform, and has earned his percentage." Mr. Justice Paxson, in reversing the judgment of the lower court, said
In regard to this instruction: " If the present claim had been by a broker for
commissions on the sale of real estate, the ruling of the court would have been
accurate. But this was a case of merchandise, and the plaintiffs were not actinz in the capacity of brokers of the defendants, but were agents to sell. That
the sales contemplated by the employer and the agents were actual sales in a
commercial sense, not mere contracts to sell." We think the same reasoning
is applicable to the case in hand. There was no sale beyond the 100 pairs, and
as to these there is no contention. As to the remaining 400 pairs, there was a
mere contract to sell. And, according to Creveling v. Wood & Leman, supra,
it mattered not whether the shoes were manufactured or not. Since, according to the ruling in said case, the salesman could not have recovered commissions on the remaining 400 pairs, and the plaintiffs, in spite of this, paid him
the whole amount, we think it would be unjust and inequitable to hold the
defendants liable for money which it was not the duty of the plaintiffs to disburse. Therefore, in so far as the judgment of the lower court is in conflict
with this opinion, we think that the judgment must be reversed, and a venire
facias de novo awarded.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
We see no error in the judgment of the court below. The plaintiff could,
in no event, recover the $300 and what he paid as commissions to his agent.
Had the contract been carried out by the defendant, the plaintiff would have
made but $300, less the commissions. Why should the commissions, in addition to the $300, be paid by the defendant, because he has broken the contract?
Judgment affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS.

By

Walter C. Clephane. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1905; .246+xvipp.
This is not a book purporting to throw further light on the substantive
law of corporations. It is rather intended as a manual for the young practitioner or law student who desires to know exactly how to apply general principles. "Starting with the request of the client that his business be incorporated," it tells the attorney "how to go through the successive stages essential
to a valid and successful organization." We know of no other book that does
just this, and to the large body of lawyers who are but seldom called on to do
work of this kind and are therefore lacking in the practical knowledge to be
gained by connection for a long time with a firm of corporation lawyers, the
book will prove very useful. It is a book on corpoiation practice rather than
on corporation law, but in so far as an understanding of principlesis necessary
to the proper organization and management of corporations, the general principles are stated.
The profession has recently been supplied with admirable treatises on the
law of corporations by Judge Thomson in "Cyc" and by Mr. Cook and Mtssrs.
Clark and Marshall and also with a "summary" of principles by Professor
Tompkins, but this book covers a field not succinctly treated by any other
work that we know of.
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The important practical questions as to where to incorporate or the
"selection of a domicile" is made easy of solution by a compact presentation of
the chief merits and demerits of the corporation laws of a dozen or more states.
The book throughout is eminently practical and popular in style and we can
recommend it to the profession and to that large class of lawyers who are connected with corporations and feel the need of a handbook of this kind.
THE LAW OF TOWNSHIPS AND THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF TOWNSHIP
OFFICERS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

By William Trickett, LL. D., Dean of

the Dickinson School of Law. Philadelphia:T. & J. IV. Johnson & Co.
565+xvi pp.
Dr. Trickett's prodigious labors have resulted in another work which will
prove o' immense value and interest to Pennsylvania lawyers. The Acts of
1899 and 1901, both of which are accorded extensive treatment in the volume,
providing for a classification of townships after the manner of that for cities,
have to no small extent revived interest in our system of local government as
administered through the township and its officers. The book is therefore
timely in this respect. The road law of 1903,. together with the department
instructions and forms have also been given generous space. Besides this, the
book concerns itself with the organization, powers, liabilities of a township
and the election and duties of its officers. An appendix of local acts applicable
to townships has been added and materially increases the value of the work.
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE. William Mack, Editor. The American Law Book Company, New York: Vol. 14, pp. 1232.
The fourteenth volume of this latest of legal encyclopedias contains seven
leading and ten subordinate articles. The volume opens with an article on
"Descent and Distribution," covering two hundred and twenty-six pages, by
George E. Tucker, of the Boston University School of Law. Mr. Tucker is
possibly best known as joint author of "Notes on the Revised Statutes of the
United States." In accord with the general character of encyclopedia articles,
this contribution does not undertake a discussion of the merits of prevailing
rules or suggest improvements in the law. But in so far as the law is ascertainable from the decisions, the principles are concisely stated with a very full
citation of authorities.
Mr. R. E. Rombauer, some time presiding judge of the St. Louis court of
appeals, has contributed an article, covering eighty-two pages, in which he
itnalyzes the subject of '"Discovery." Modern statutes have made such great
changes in the rules governing the competency of witnesses that the writer
was quite just ified in devoting more than half his article to a discussion of discovery under these statutory provisions. The termination of suits by dismissal, discontinuance, non-suit, etc., is carefully reviewed by Mr. N. A. Martin in an extended article.
Probably the most important articles in the volume are those on "Divorce "and "Dower."
The great diversity of the law on the subject of divorce,
coupled with the fact that the attainment of the much desired uniformity of
legislation on the subject is likely to be indefinitely deferred, renders an exhaustive collection of the cases, brought down to date, of particular value. The
writer is well known as the author of " Gilbert on Commercial g aper," and ai
the editor of "American Electrical Cases" and numerous other law publications.
Among the various shorter articles by well-known writers mention should
be made of the articles of Henry C. Black, Louis L. Hammon and H. Gerald
Chapin. On the whole the fourteenth volume may be readily conceded to be
quite up to the high standard set by its predecessors.

